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BACKGROUND: Distortions in metacognition—the ability to reﬂect on and control other cognitive processes—are
thought to be characteristic of poor mental health. However, it remains unknown whether such shifts in self-evaluation
are due to speciﬁc alterations in metacognition and/or a downstream consequence of changes in decision-making
processes.
METHODS: Using perceptual decision making as a model system, we employed a computational psychiatry
approach to relate parameters governing both decision formation and metacognitive evaluation to self-reported
transdiagnostic symptom dimensions in a large general population sample (N = 995).
RESULTS: Variability in psychopathology was unrelated to either speed or accuracy of decision formation. In
contrast, leveraging a dimensional approach, we revealed independent relationships between psychopathology and
metacognition: a symptom dimension related to anxiety and depression was associated with lower conﬁdence and
heightened metacognitive efﬁciency, whereas a dimension characterizing compulsive behavior and intrusive thoughts
was associated with higher conﬁdence and lower metacognitive efﬁciency. Furthermore, we obtained a robust double
dissociation—whereas psychiatric symptoms predicted changes in metacognition but not decision performance, age
predicted changes in decision performance but not metacognition.
CONCLUSIONS: Our ﬁndings indicate a speciﬁc and pervasive link between metacognition and mental health. Our
study bridges a gap between an emerging neuroscience of decision making and an understanding of metacognitive
alterations in psychopathology.
Keywords: Cognitive neuroscience, Computational psychiatry, Conﬁdence, Decision making, Metacognition,
Psychopathology
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2017.12.017Theoretical models suggest that alterations in metacognition,
an ability to reﬂect on and evaluate one’s behavior, are char-
acteristic of poor mental health (1,2). If this evaluation process
is disrupted, diverse and subtle changes in behavior can ensue
(3). For instance, pervasive low conﬁdence in one’s abilities
may become self-fulﬁlling (4,5), whereas overconﬁdence and
blunted metacognition may lead to risky decision making (6)
and delusional beliefs (7–9). Notably, the level of conﬁdence
is a relatively stable feature of individuals’ judgments that
generalizes across different tasks (10–12) and has an inherited
component (13), suggesting that it may represent a trait-level
predictor of psychopathology.
However, establishing a formal relationship between meta-
cognition and psychopathology has remained elusive for at
least two reasons. First, changes in processes supporting
decision formation, metacognition, or both may plausibly lead
to widespread behavioral alterations. It is increasingly appre-
ciated that there is a two-way relationship between decision
making and metacognitive evaluation. Performing better at a
task leads to greater conﬁdence (14,15), and conﬁdenceª 2018 Society o
N: 0006-3223estimates in turn shape and control choices (12,16), thereby
“setting the switches” for lower-level decision processes
(17,18). Therefore, to isolate changes in metacognitive pro-
cesses, it is critical to identify and control for confounding
changes in performance (19,20).
Second, for some symptom clusters, one would paradoxi-
cally predict both underconﬁdence and overconﬁdence (21).
For instance, in schizophrenia, one might expect the presence
of positive symptoms, such as delusions, to be associated
with overconﬁdence (8), whereas negative symptoms, such as
apathy, might be associated with underconﬁdence (22). One
possibility is that this apparent paradox reﬂects issues with our
use of DSM diagnostic categories in psychiatric research,
where there is growing consensus that diagnostic labels, such
as schizophrenia, are unlikely to reﬂect unitary, biologically
plausible, or informative markers of mental health (23–25). In
response, a new ﬁeld of so-called computational psychiatry is
emerging, with the aim of relating core brain processes un-
derpinning complex behavior to transdiagnostic features of
signiﬁcance for mental health (26–28).f Biological Psychiatry. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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PsychiatryIn the present study, we adopt a computational psychiatry
approach, leveraging a large-scale general population sample
(N = 995) (29,30) to interrogate the relationship between de-
cision making, metacognition, and self-reported psychopa-
thology. We dissected and quantiﬁed distinct aspects of
decision formation and metacognition using sequential sam-
pling and signal detection-theoretical models (14,20,31,32) in a
perceptual decision-making task (33). Critically, a dimensional
analysis uncovered dissociable relationships between distinct
aspects of psychopathology and metacognition in the absence
of any links to decision formation. Subjects with greater
anxious-depressive symptoms exhibited lower conﬁdence and
improved metacognition, whereas a symptom dimension
characterized by compulsive behavior and intrusive thought
(not predicted by any questionnaire score alone) was associ-
ated with overconﬁdence and blunted metacognition. Our
ﬁndings indicate that studying metacognitive mechanisms will
be fruitful in bridging a gap between a neuroscience of deci-
sion making and core underpinnings of psychopathology.METHODS AND MATERIALS
Participants
Data were collected online using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(experiment 1: 663 participants, 18–75 years of age; experiment
2: 637 participants, 18–70 years of age). Beyond the symptom
questionnaires, no information about psychiatric diagnosis or
medication was recorded (Supplemental Figure S1). It remains
possible that at the extremes of the spectrum, certain partici-
pants would qualify for a psychiatric diagnosis and thereforeDifficulty bin
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2 Biological Psychiatry - -, 2018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/journalhave a higher likelihood of being treated with psychotropic
medication, but our focus here is on continuous variation in
psychopathology in the general population. Participants pro-
vided consent in accordance with procedures approved by the
University College London Research Ethics Committee (Project
ID 1260/003). Subjects were paid a base sum of $4 plus a $2
bonus conditional on both above-chance task performance and
passing a check question (Supplemental Methods).
Perceptual Decision-Making Task
Participants were asked to judge which of two boxes con-
tained the higher number of dots (Figure 1A) and to report their
conﬁdence in each judgment on a rating scale. Across both
experiments, participants performed 210 trials divided into ﬁve
blocks. In experiment 2, we added a calibration procedure to
maintain a constant level of performance both during the
experiment and across participants (19,34). Further details are
provided in the Supplement.
Self-report Psychiatric Questionnaires
After the task, subjects completed standard self-report ques-
tionnaires assessing a range of psychiatric symptoms
(Supplemental Figure S1), including depression (Zung Self-Rating
Depression Scale) (35), generalized anxiety (Generalized Anxiety
Disorder 7-item scale) (36), schizotypy (Short Scales for
Measuring Schizotypy) (37), impulsivity (Barratt Impulsiveness
Scale 11) (38), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Obsessive-
Compulsive Inventory-Revised [OCI-R]) (39), and social anxiety
(Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale) (40), and a short IQ evaluation
(International Cognitive Ability Resource) (41) (see SupplementalDifficulty bin
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ice and conﬁdence responses were unspeeded. (B, C) Behavioral data and
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nce rating distributions for correct and incorrect trials. Subjects gave higher
te SEM; vertical lines denote the average conﬁdence level for each response
across subjects (n = 498).
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PsychiatryMethods). In experiment 2, we added eating disorders (Eating
Attitudes Test), apathy (Apathy Evaluation Scale), and alcoholism
(Alcohol Use Disorders Identiﬁcation Test) questionnaires.
Exclusion Criteria
To ensure data quality, several exclusion criteria were applied for
both task comprehension and performance (see Supplemental
Methods). Across both experiments, approximately 23% of
participants were excluded from further analysis, leaving 498
participants for experiment 1 and 497 participants for experi-
ment 2. Exclusion criteria were predeﬁned and reﬂect standard
guidelines for online data collection (42), and the overall exclu-
sion rate was consistent with a recent meta-analysis, which
found that between 3% and 37% of the sample is typically
excluded in web-based experiments (43).
Drift-Diffusion Model
Decision formation was characterized using the drift-diffusion
model (DDM), which models two-choice decision making as a
process of accumulating noisy evidence over timewith a certain
speed, or drift rate (v), until one of two decision boundaries are
crossed (32). The model was ﬁt to accuracy-coded data with
four free parameters: nondecision time, decision threshold,
baseline drift rate (v0), and effect of dots difference on drift rate
(vd). Mean posterior estimates were extracted for entry into
subsequent regression analyses. Full details of the model and
ﬁtting procedure are provided in the Supplement.
Linear Regressions
We conducted linear regressions to examine the relationship
between psychiatric symptoms, age, and IQ and task-related
variables (accuracy, DDM parameters, conﬁdence level, and
metacognitive efﬁciency). Z scores of all regressors were
calculated toensure comparabilityof regressioncoefﬁcients. For
details of regression equations, see the Supplement. The code
and data to reproduce regression analyses are freely available at
https://github.com/metacoglab/RouaultSeowGillanFleming.
Quantifying Conﬁdence Level (Bias) and
Metacognitive Efﬁciency
In experiment 2, we leveraged signal detection theory to char-
acterize the sensitivity of an observer’s conﬁdence reports to
correct or incorrect judgments (19). This approach posits a
generative model of the conﬁdence data and returns a param-
eter, meta-d0, that reﬂects an individual’s metacognitive sensi-
tivity (14). Meta-d0 can be compared with decision d0 to provide a
relative measure of metacognitive efﬁciency, log(meta-d0/d0),
controlling for task performance. Conﬁdence level is indepen-
dent of metacognitive efﬁciency (20) and reﬂects the tendency to
use higher or lower conﬁdence ratings regardless of their ﬂuc-
tuation owing to performance (see Supplemental Methods).
Factor Analysis
In experiment 2, we applied a factor analysis to obtain a
parsimonious latent structure for explaining shared variance at
the item level across questionnaires (Supplemental Figure S2).
We selected the number of factors based on Cattell’s criterion
(44), in which a sharp elbow indicates the point at which there
is little beneﬁt to retaining additional factors. Using the sameBbattery of questionnaires, Gillan et al. (29) found that a model
with three underlying factors (labeled anxious-depression [AD],
compulsive behavior and intrusive thought [CIT], and social
withdrawal [SW]) provided the best account of the covariance
across individual questionnaire items. Our sample size in
experiment 2 (n = 497) provides a relatively low subject-to-
variable ratio for de novo factor analysis. To ensure that our
obtained solution replicates previous results obtained with this
questionnaire set (29), we therefore compared the correlation
structure of item loadings between our current study and that
of Gillan et al. (29), who had access to a substantially higher
subject-to-variable ratio (N = 1413 subjects).RESULTS
In experiment 1 (n = 498), participants ﬁrst performed a
perceptual decision-making task in which they were asked to
judge which of two boxes contained a greater number of dots
and to rate their conﬁdence in each decision (Figure 1A). Next,
they responded to a number of self-report questionnaires
assessing a range of mental health symptoms, followed by a
shortened IQ evaluation (see Supplemental Methods).
As expected, choice accuracy increased and response
times decreased as the difference in number of dots became
greater (Figure 1B, C). Across trials, reported conﬁdence was
reliably related to decision accuracy (median within-subject
correlation: r = .25, p , .0005, ranging from r = 2.05 to r =
.59), owing to subjects’ reporting higher conﬁdence ratings for
correct than for incorrect choices (Figure 1D). Across partici-
pants, we observed considerable variability in both perfor-
mance (Figure 1E) and conﬁdence (Figure 1F); however,
performance accounted for only 3.2% of the variance in con-
ﬁdence levels (between-subject correlation: r = .18, p ,
.0005). This allowed us to separately study the contribution of
psychiatric symptoms to decision formation (speed and
accuracy) and metacognition.
To further dissect processes underpinning decision forma-
tion, we ﬁtted a DDM to participants’ choices and response
times (31,32). The DDM models two-choice decision making
as a process of accumulating noisy evidence over time with a
certain speed, or drift rate. Simulations of the ﬁtted model
show that it captured variation in both accuracy (Figure 1B)
and response times (Figure 1C) as a function of difﬁculty.
Consistent with previous studies (45), we found that age
and IQ predicted changes in decision formation, with older
age associated with slower, less accurate decisions
(Supplemental Figure S6A and Supplemental Results). In
contrast, neither age nor IQ was related to conﬁdence
(Supplemental Figure S6A).
We next turned to the relationship between decision mak-
ing, metacognition, and psychiatric symptoms (self-reported
social anxiety, generalized anxiety, depression, impulsivity,
OCD, and schizotypy), systematically controlling for the effects
of age, IQ, and gender (Figure 2 and Supplemental Figure S1).
In contrast to age, psychiatric symptoms were not associated
with decision accuracy (Figure 2) or DDM parameters gov-
erning decision formation (Supplemental Figure S7A). How-
ever, in line with our hypothesis, we found that self-reported
depression, social anxiety, and generalized anxiety scores all
were associated with lower conﬁdence level (all b , 2.12, alliological Psychiatry - -, 2018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/journal 3
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Figure 2. Association between decision (left) and metacognitive (right)
variables with self-reported psychopathology in experiment 1 (n = 498).
Each psychiatric symptom was examined in a separate regression, addi-
tionally controlling for the inﬂuence of age, gender, and IQ. The y axis in-
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symptom scores. Anxiety and depression symptoms were related to lower
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number of dependent variables tested. See also Supplemental Figure S7A.
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Psychiatryp , .05) (Figure 2). Impulsivity, OCD, and schizotypy scores
exhibited no association with conﬁdence level (all p . .05).
In keeping with good statistical practice in large datasets,
we set out to replicate these effects in a second experiment
(n = 497), while addressing two limitations of experiment 1.
First, we observed strong correlations between individual
questionnaire scores consistent with comorbidity between
these constructs (e.g., generalized anxiety and depression
correlated at r = .75). Moreover, even within a particular
questionnaire, different items may map onto separable latent
factors, which are unobservable in traditional analyses. The set
of questionnaires in experiment 1 was not a priori designed to
enable the identiﬁcation of such latent factors. To address this
issue, we included additional questionnaires allowing identiﬁ-
cation of underlying transdiagnostic psychiatric dimensions0
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4 Biological Psychiatry - -, 2018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/journalthrough application of factor analysis (29). We identiﬁed three
dissociable factors (dimensions) that cut across the nine
questionnaires from which the 209 items were drawn
(Figure 3), replicating previous ﬁndings (Supplemental
Figure S9). These factors were labeled AD, CIT, and SW (see
Supplemental Methods for further details).
Second, to more precisely isolate shifts in metacognition from
ﬂuctuations in decision performance, we equated performance
across individuals using a continuous staircase procedure
(Supplemental Figure S4C) (19,34). Importantly, in experiment 2,
this design change allowed us to compute not only conﬁdence
level (metacognitive bias) but also metacognitive efﬁciency
(meta-d0/d0). Conﬁdence level indexes a general tendency to
respond with higher or lower conﬁdence ratings regardless of
objective performance, whereas metacognitive efﬁciency quan-
tiﬁes how well one distinguishes between correct and error trials
(10,20); both measures were empirically dissociated in the cur-
rent dataset (r = .036, p = .42).
Consistent with experiment 1, we found no association
between psychiatric symptoms and decision formation
(Supplemental Figures S5 and S7B), despite replicating sig-
niﬁcant negative relationships with conﬁdence level (apathy
b = 2.14, p , .01, generalized and social anxiety both
b = 2.10, p , .05 uncorrected) (Supplemental Figure S5). We
next tested for an association between subjects’ scores on the
three identiﬁed symptom dimensions and their separately
measured proﬁles of decision formation and metacognition
(Figure 4). When including all three factors in the same
regression model (and controlling for IQ, age, and gender),
accuracy and decision formation parameters exhibited no
relationship with psychiatric factors (Figure 4 and
Supplemental Figure S7C). However, the AD factor was
signiﬁcantly associated with lower conﬁdence level (b = 2.20,
p , .001), whereas the CIT factor was signiﬁcantly associated
with higher conﬁdence level (b = .23, p , .001) (Figure 4).
Importantly, the identiﬁed subcategories of symptoms related
to heightened conﬁdence level were not visible in standardr ‘Compulsive Behavior and Intrusive Thought’
Factor ‘Social Withdrawal’
Individual questionnaire items (209 items)
Factor ‘Anxious-Depression’
Alcoholism
Apathy
Depression
Eating Disorders
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een all questionnaire items. (A) Correlation matrix of 209 questionnaire items
s across subjects. The color scale indicates the correlation coefﬁcient.
est accounted for our data. We labeled these factors anxious-depression,
e strongest individual item loadings. The inset corresponds to a zoom on the
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highlighting the power of a dimensional analysis. Meta-
cognitive efﬁciency (meta-d0/d0) exhibited the reverse
relationship with symptom clusters: it was increased in sub-
jects with higher scores on the AD factor and decreased in
subjects with higher scores on the CIT factor (Figure 4) (note
that these ﬁndings did not survive correction for multiple
comparisons and should therefore be interpreted with caution)
(AD, b = .11, puncorrected = .04; CIT, b = 2.12, puncorrected = .02).
We next asked whether these positive and negative re-
lationships between metacognition and symptom clusters were
signiﬁcantly different from one another. As expected, given their
opposite signs, the coefﬁcients for conﬁdence level (p, .0001)
and metacognitive efﬁciency (p = .03) differed between the AD
and CIT factors. Conﬁdence level coefﬁcients additionally
differed between CIT and SW (p , .0002) but not between AD
and SW (p = .07). Metacognitive efﬁciency did not differ be-
tween SW and either AD or CIT (both p . .16). Notably, the
absolute magnitudes of these effects were similar: conﬁdence
level was not more strongly associated with AD than with CIT
(p = .5); likewise, metacognitive efﬁciency was not more
strongly associated with AD than with CIT (p = .8). All relation-
ships between symptom dimensions and metacognition
remained when additionally controlling for all aspects of deci-
sion formation in the same regression model (Supplemental
Figure S8). Finally, and importantly, our results could not be
ascribed to a trivial anticorrelation between AD and CIT scores.
While our factor analytic approach allowed factors to be
correlated, we in fact found that AD and CIT were positively
correlated (r = .36)—the opposite of what would be required to−0.2
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Figure 4. Factor analysis on the correlation matrix of 209 questionnaire
items revealed a three-factor solution comprising anxious-depression,
compulsive behavior and intrusive thought, and social withdrawal di-
mensions. Entry of these factors into a multiple regression model predicting
decision formation and metacognition revealed bidirectional effects of
anxious-depression and compulsive behavior and intrusive thought factors
on conﬁdence level, despite no relationships with performance. op , .05
uncorrected, ***p , .001 corrected for multiple comparisons over the
number of dependent variables tested. See also Supplemental Figures S7C
and S8. NS, not signiﬁcant.
Bproduce a spurious association with metacognition. Together,
these results reveal that the AD and CIT symptom dimensions
exert equal and opposite effects on two key aspects of
metacognition—conﬁdence level and metacognitive efﬁciency.
To assess the relative signiﬁcance of these effects, we next
entered metacognitive variables and accuracy as predictors of
individual factor scores in separate regressions. Factor scores
were signiﬁcantly explained by conﬁdence level (b =2.13 for AD
and b = .15 for CIT, both p, .003) but not accuracy (both p. .6)
or metacognitive efﬁciency (p = .1 for AD, trend at p = .04 for
CIT). In addition, the association between each factor and
conﬁdence level effect was greater in magnitude than the cor-
responding relationship with accuracy (both p , .03).
To further quantify the extent to which including psychiatric
factor scores explains individual differences in decision for-
mation and metacognition, we computed the Bayesian infor-
mation criterion for each regression model (Supplemental
Methods). A simpler age/IQ–only model was able to account
for decision formation and metacognitive efﬁciency (Figure 5).
Indeed, it was notable that there was very strong evidence
against the additional complexity induced by including psy-
chiatric factors in models of decision formation. In contrast,
and in keeping with our regression analyses, there was very
strong evidence for including psychiatric symptom dimensions
in addition to age and IQ to explain conﬁdence level.DISCUSSION
While distortions in self-evaluation are theorized to occur in
many disorders of mental health, it has remained unknown
whether these changes are due to selective alterations in
metacognition and/or a downstream consequence of changes
in sensory and decision processes. In this article, we show
that self-reported psychiatric symptoms are associated with
speciﬁc shifts in conﬁdence but not performance in a
controlled perceptual decision-making task. Our quantitative
approach revealed two distinct relationships between psy-
chopathology and metacognition: an AD symptom dimension
was associated with lower conﬁdence level and heightened
metacognitive efﬁciency, and a CIT symptom dimension was
associated with higher conﬁdence level and disrupted meta-
cognitive efﬁciency, despite accuracy and parameters gov-
erning decision formation remaining unaffected. This
relationship was found across different methods of eliciting
conﬁdence: a numerical probability scale (0%–100% correct)
in experiment 1 and a verbal scale (from guessing to certain) in
experiment 2. Our ﬁndings suggest an endogenous set-point
for conﬁdence, in keeping with recent evidence that conﬁ-
dence level represents a stable individual difference that
transcends both task and temporal focus (10,46). Taken
together, our ﬁndings reveal that shifts in metacognitive
evaluation represent a speciﬁc and pervasive behavioral
correlate of subclinical psychopathology.
A relationship between lower conﬁdence level and an AD
symptom dimension is consistent with depression’s being
characterized by pervasive negative shifts in self-evaluation
(5,47,48). For instance, patients with depression overattribute
negative outcomes and underattribute positive outcomes to
self-performance compared with control subjects (49). More
broadly, dysfunctional self-evaluation may engender low self-iological Psychiatry - -, 2018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/journal 5
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Psychiatryefﬁcacy, in which failures are attributed to low ability rather
than to insufﬁcient effort or external circumstances, in turn
leading to negative beliefs about one’s ability to cope with
difﬁculties and overcome challenges (3). Supporting this idea,
theoretical simulations of an evolutionary model have shown
that, counterintuitively, maintaining overconﬁdence can pro-
duce ﬁtness beneﬁts by promoting action (6). The strongest
predictor of lowered conﬁdence in experiment 2 was the
apathy score, and brain regions involved in decision evaluation
and motivation are also predictive of changes in apathy (50). It
is therefore plausible that some symptoms of apathy and
depression may emerge partly through a systematic under-
valuation of one’s abilities (22,51). Interestingly, the AD
symptom dimension also showed a weaker positive relation-
ship with metacognitive efﬁciency, consistent with greater
insight into performance ﬂuctuations.
In contrast, a symptom dimension characterizing CIT was
associated with heightened conﬁdence level and disrupted
metacognition. Whereas this factor captures shared features of
OCD, schizotypy, and eating disorders (29), critically, no indi-
vidual questionnaire score signiﬁcantly predicted heightened
conﬁdence. Only through identiﬁcation of latent factors was a
relationship between metacognition and CIT psychopathology
uncovered. This ﬁnding has important ramiﬁcations for
emerging reports of metacognitive alterations in psychiatric
disorders. For instance, whereas some studies infer under-
conﬁdence in patients with OCD, manifest by repeated
checking behaviors (52), other authors have observed that
conﬁdence in perceptual decision making is positively related
to OCI-R scores (53). Conversely, Banca et al. (54) observed
changes in decision formation parameters without changes in
conﬁdence levels in patients with OCD, albeit selectively on
high difﬁculty trials. When examining raw OCI-R scores in our
study, it is notable that we also ﬁnd a trend-level increase in
decision threshold in the absence of any effect of conﬁdence.
However, as OCD is often comorbid with anxiety, consistent
with a subset of the OCI-R items positively loading on the AD
factor in experiment 2 (Figure 3C), an anxiety-related compo-
nent could explain previous observations of underconﬁdence
in patients. Instead, our ﬁndings of disrupted metacognition in
high-CIT individuals is consistent with recent ﬁndings of low-
ered metacognitive efﬁciency in high versus low compulsive
participants who were matched for depression and anxiety
symptoms (55). Such considerations underscore the relevance
of applying a dimensional approach to relate cognitive differ-
ences to psychopathology (26).
Several items from the schizotypy questionnaire also
contributed to the CIT construct and were found to be positive6 Biological Psychiatry - -, 2018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/journalpredictors of conﬁdence level in our independent supervised
analysis. Our results are therefore partly consistent with pre-
vious evidence of overconﬁdence and a jump-to-conclusions
bias in patients with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disor-
ders, i.e., disorders that map onto the CIT dimension (7,8).
However, we also found evidence against a corresponding
relationship between schizotypy and parameters governing the
process of decision formation. If overconﬁdence reﬂected a
generalized bias in evidence accumulation, one would also
expect it to affect task performance, for instance, through
adjustments in the threshold amount of evidence needed to
make a decision. Instead, our ﬁndings are of a strikingly spe-
ciﬁc link between psychopathology and metacognition. As we
discuss below, it is possible that in other tasks, a mutual
relationship between metacognition and decision making
would manifest as a change in subsequent adjustment of ﬁrst-
order performance. Gillan et al. (29) found that a CIT symptom
dimension was associated with a reduction in goal-directed
control, potentially conferring vulnerability to developing rigid
habits. Overconﬁdence could impair behavioral ﬂexibility
through formation and reinforcement of more rigid beliefs,
which in turn would predict reductions in goal-directed control.
Alternatively, conﬁdence could be a distinct aspect of decision
making that is altered in these individuals (56).
There is growing evidence that decision formation and
metacognitive evaluation maintain a reciprocal relationship.
Task performance inﬂuences conﬁdence, and beliefs about
self-efﬁcacy determine the goals one chooses to pursue (3).
Here we dissected decision formation and metacognition in a
simple perceptual decision task that minimized requirements
for learning, and thus from a normative point of view, conﬁ-
dence was less useful for behavioral adjustments. Indeed,
this aspect of our experimental design was critical for
isolating metacognitive shifts from changes in decision per-
formance. In many other settings, accurately inferring one’s
conﬁdence in a task is an important indicator of whether a
previous decision should be revised (17,57), whether a sub-
sequent step in a chain of decisions should be initiated (58),
or more generally when it is advantageous to deliberate (59)
or engage cognitive control (18). Our ﬁndings speak to
computational models of conﬁdence (15): while previous
work has focused on modeling trial-level determinants of
decision conﬁdence (60,61), the between-subjects variance
typically captured by one or more free parameters in such
models could reﬂect systematic trait-level differences among
individuals. In turn, because widespread alterations in behav-
ioral control are a pervasive characteristic of many mental
disorders (26), our results suggest that alterations in
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transdiagnostic psychopathology. It remains to be determined
which step in the conﬁdence computation is altered—for
instance, alterations in the estimation of perceptual uncer-
tainty, representations of self-action, and/or a mapping onto
explicit reports could be affected. Answering this question may
proﬁt from novel tasks that enable disentangling elements of a
conﬁdence computation—for instance, selective changes in
the inﬂuence of evidence variability, postdecisional processing,
and/or action kinematics. Future work should also investigate
how changes in metacognition impact cognitive control,
learning, and behavioral adaptation, and determine how such
control processes go awry in psychiatric disorders.
We stress that we did not screen for a categorical pres-
ence or absence of psychiatric disorders using structured
clinical interviews; instead, we collected a general population
sample with continuous variation along self-reported symp-
tom dimensions (see Methods and Materials). As such, there
are limits as to what we can infer about patients with psy-
chiatric diagnoses from these data. However, prior work has
shown that this methodology maps closely onto ﬁndings
from small sample case-control designs. For example, fail-
ures in goal-directed (model-based) planning observed in
patients with OCD that has been carefully diagnosed are
mirrored in self-report scores in general population samples
[patients with a diagnosis (62), general population sample
(29)]. Furthermore, Rutledge et al. (63) found a comparable
inﬂuence of expected values and reward prediction errors on
momentary mood ratings in laboratory-based depressed and
control participants compared with online participants with
high and low depression scores (Beck Depression Inventory).
The advantage of our methodology over more standard
approaches is that a large sample allows us to control for,
and indeed leverage, individual patterns of dimensional
psychopathology on a within-participant basis—something
that has not been possible in typical case-control studies.
As such, this approach provides a powerful new pathway
toward testing the merits of a dimensional view of psychiatry
(25), consistent with the broader goals of the burgeoning
computational psychiatry movement (26,27).
In this article, we used perceptual decision making as a
model system, allowing precise control over performance to
reveal relationships between symptoms and metacognition. It
remains to be explored how our ﬁndings may extend to other
types of decisions (e.g., value-based) or other cognitive do-
mains, such as memory. However, recent evidence points to-
ward metacognition relying in part on domain-general
resources, suggesting that ﬁndings from the present study are
likely to generalize to other scenarios. For instance, there are
shared neural and behavioral correlates of metacognition
across visual, auditory, and tactile modalities (64) and between
perception and memory (65). Moreover, a recent study of older
participants found that metacognition in a go/no-go task
correlated with monitoring deﬁcits in daily life (66). In turn,
conﬁdence level and metacognitive efﬁciency have been linked
to different adaptive beneﬁts. On one hand, well-calibrated
beliefs about performance (high metacognitive efﬁciency)
may facilitate control of behavior, for instance, by modulating
resource allocation and exploration (18) and cognitive off-
loading (67). On the other hand, appropriate bias/conﬁdenceBlevel is linked to self-efﬁcacy and educational achievement
(3,68), whereas excessive conﬁdence may lead to maladaptive
risk taking (69). It is hoped that our ﬁndings on metacognition
may hold implications for treatment development: beliefs
about one’s abilities represent a promising target for therapy in
anxiety and depression (2). Furthermore, animal models now
exist for understanding conﬁdence computation at the level of
neural circuits in both rodents and nonhuman primates (70).
Understanding the mechanisms supporting metacognition
may allow development of behavioral and neural interventions
to restore accurate self-evaluation in the future (71). For
instance, providing false feedback to healthy individuals
engaged in a perceptual decision-making task is sufﬁcient to
boost conﬁdence and self-efﬁcacy and heighten subsequent
task performance (4). Thus, by applying a transdiagnostic
approach to the quantiﬁcation of decision making and meta-
cognition, strategies for ameliorating evaluative deﬁcits in
psychiatric disorders may be uncovered.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND DISCLOSURES
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